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1. Introduction 
 
This working paper briefly sets out the background to the current project and reviews 
in detail seven key empirical studies, which examined the behaviour of politicians as 
‘end-users’ of performance metrics. In addition to considering main findings, the 
review has been used to examine alternative research designs and methods, which 
may be employed in the current study and to identify behavioural explanations which 
may be of relevance to the current study.  
 
2. Performance metrics 
 
The term ‘metrics’ refers to measures of performance, such as indicators, targets, 
ratios, league tables or benchmarks, which are used to assess and monitor the quality 
of care that patients receive in health services. (Institute of Medicine 2001; Walburg, 
Bevan, Wilderspin and Lemmens 2006).  While the term ‘metrics’ is widely used, 
particularly in the area of health policy, there is not a single term which denotes this 
range of information. The terms performance information and policy information are 
used in the studies reviewed to refer to the same systems described in the current 
study as performance metrics. The term accounting information may also, in certain 
circumstances, be used in an inclusive fashion to embrace performance. Government, 
audit agencies, local health service providers, professional bodies are likely to be the 
principle sources of performance metrics. Performance metrics will be available to 
parliamentarians in many different forms including evaluations, annual reports, audits 
and budget-related performance information. The sources of performance metrics will 
include both agencies of the state and non-government organizations. 
Parliamentarians may also be in a position to conduct inquiries themselves through 
the work of subject committees. Internationally, health services are usually located in 
a policy process particularly rich in performance metrics. In the United Kingdom the 
NHS has moved from a low capacity for performance measurement, as recorded by 
the Griffiths Report in 1984, to become an international leader in the production of 
performance metrics.  
 
3. The current project – some background 
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The current study is focused on Scottish parliamentarians’ use of health care related 
performance metrics. The study is exploratory and intended to indicate how a 
comparative study could be designed at a subsequent stage. It is logical in an era of 
greater political transparency, where for example the work of health service provider 
organizations, doctors and other clinicians comes under measurement on a systematic 
basis to want to know the extent to which parliamentarians take the opportunity to 
examine metrics to conduct oversight, make suggestions for improvement and take 
informed decisions. If used in the context of such a rational scheme of governance, 
performance metrics have major significance as resources for enabling an 
enhancement of the democratic process. The capacity of parliamentarians to access 
and use performance metrics and other types of evidence would underpin their 
judgments, which inevitably would be much influenced by the concepts of 
performance underpinning the production of performance metrics. Performance 
metrics may be crucial in realising the practice of transparent government. For 
proponents of transparent government, performance metrics based around easily 
accessed, unambiguous performance concepts facilitate the ‘reading’ of the policy 
process by interested parties outside of government. Yet in spite of the easy logic for 
adoption, the promise of a ‘rational’ performance metrics influenced democracy, 
conducted through a transparent governance system, where information is both 
available and valued  by parliamentary users, is not yet proven to influence political 
practice.  As O’Neil (2006) has observed in relation to transparency, little of 
consequence may be gained unless there are effective mechanisms of communication 
which cause stakeholders to actually examine the records of either government or 
private institutions.  Revealing the performance of public services through publicly 
accessible sets of performance metrics, however systematic in their coverage, is not 
enough in itself to remedy democratic deficits. Taking this criticism of the 
transparency boom one stage further, we should also question the impact of 
performance metrics for democracy, even if they are effectively communicated to 
parliamentarians, when there is also scant evidence of their use in the pursuit of 
oversight functions. The current study is also intended to add to the literature dealing 
with such emergent paradoxes in the application of NPM. (Hood & Peters, 2004) 
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While the academic community has made considerable progress in relation to 
researching the growth in performance management over the past twenty years, much 
of the work has been focused on describing, categorizing or probing the accuracy of 
performance measures. (Armstrong, 2001; Holzer & Yang, 2004; Pollitt 2006; Boyne, 
Meier, O'Toole, & Walker, 2006).  Pollitt (2005) concluded in a recent review of 
published evidence that use of performance metrics is patchy and that much of what 
has been established suggests that evaluations, performance reports and audits are in 
fact seldom highly valued by politicians. A literature review conducted by Van de 
Walle & Boivard  (2007) also found little evidence to confirm strong interest in 
performance metrics from politicians.   
   
4. Literature review  
 
The studies discussed below all relate to performance metrics and oversight. This is 
what is meant here by the term politicians as ‘end-users’. Studies which deal with the 
related problem of discovering how performance metrics are used in different aspects 
of the policy process, such as agenda setting or decision taking, are not dealt with in 
this working paper. Also, only studies which gathered empirical data are considered. 
A significantly larger literature exists in relation to the use of performance metrics by 
government, some of which has an empirical basis. Seven articles were retrieved 
which met the twin criteria of being sufficiently focused on oversight and making 
reference to new empirical data. Table 1 sets out general features of the seven studies 
examined.  
 
Table 1. Empirical studies of the behaviour of politicians using performance metrics in the 
act of oversight.  
Investigators  Institutional 
focus/users  
Data gathering 
method  
Population/ 
response rate 
Time fame  
Ezzamel et al 
(2004) 
Four parliaments/ 
parliamentarians  
Scotland, Wales, N. 
Ireland and New 
Zealand            
Mixed. 
Semi-structured   
interviews, 
document 
analysis and 
observation of 
committee 
meetings  
Members, officials, 
advisers, population 
 
58 interviews  
Response rate: not 
specified 
  
Document 
analysis 1999-
2003  
   
Interviews 
2002-3  
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van Dooren 
(2004) 
 
Members of 
Parliament Flemish 
Region Belgium 
Single. 
Content analysis 
of transcripts of 
270 
parliamentary 
questions 
Random selection of 
30 questions from 9 
policy sectors within 
the competence of 
the Flemish Region 
Government. 
 
Response rate – not 
applicable 
2000-3 
ter Bogt (2004)  Dutch municipal 
government/ 
aldermen  
Mixed. 
Content analysis 
of planning and 
control 
documents, 
conversations 
with civil 
servants / 
Questionnaire –
aldermen  
 698 alderman  
(from 165 municipal 
authorities chosen 
from a total of 206)  
 
Response rate -  
37.5%  
Three year  
for document 
review  
2002-5  
 
Interviews 
2003  
Ho (2005)  US municipal 
government/ 
elected mayors of 
US towns  
Mixed. 
Phase 1. 
questionnaire, 
fixed-questions  
Phase 2.  
interviews  
Phase 1. 697 mayors.  
 
Response rate - 39%  
 
Phase 2  5 from 13 
Sampling details 
provided  
Questionnaire 
and 
interviews 
2003 
Sterk & 
Bouckaert, 
(2006)  
Parliaments in 
Australia, the 
Netherlands, 
Sweden and 
Canada/ 
Experts, mainly 
civil servants 
Mixed. Semi-
standardized 
interviews with 
experts  
Content analysis: 
Government 
reports, budgets 
and legislation 
60 experts in four 
countries 
 
Response rate: 
selection criteria not 
specified 
Document 
analysis 2002-
5  
 
Interviews 
2005 
Johnson & 
Talbot (2007)  
House of 
Commons/MPs 
Committee Clerks  
Mixed. 
Questionnaire 
survey  
Document 
content analysis 
of select 
committee 
reports 2002-5  
 
 
 All members of 
select committees -
241. Response rate - 
17%  
 All committee clerks 
- 43. Response rate -
43%  
 
Documents from 11 
Select committees.   
 
Document 
review  
2002-5  
   
   
Questionnaire 
2005 
Askim (2007)  Norwegian local 
authorities/ 
councillors  
Single. 
National 
questionnaire 
survey 
Population -1500 
councillors. 
 
Response rate -  
50%  
Questionnaire 
2005 
 
 6 
5. Focus of studies and key findings 
 
In an effort to discover how devolution in the United Kingdom had impacted on the 
use of accounting information, defined in broad terms to include performance metrics, 
Ezzamel and colleagues focused on the oversight work of parliamentarians in 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments/assemblies. They further examined 
usage in New Zealand to establish a further sense of perspective and comparative 
reference point.  Ezzamel et al found evidence of greater than expected transparency, 
consultation and scrutiny in regards budgets, accounts and performance but also 
strong indications that there was extensive information overload facing 
parliamentarians and hence greater than anticipated reliance on experts and advisers. 
They also acknowledge the need for a more detailed longitudinal study. The current 
study is designed to meet this requirement.  
 
Van Dooren, 2004 tested the claim made by civil servants about the lack of political 
interest in the policy indicators that the administration makes available and examined 
issues related to the supply and demand for such data. The term ‘policy indicator’ is 
used in similar sense to ‘performance metrics’, although probably his definition is 
more inclusive than in the current study (insufficient evidence is provided to verify 
this conclusion).  The results of a content analysis of 270 parliamentary questions in 
the Flemish parliament refuted this contention. Van Dooren’s study was concerned 
with the ad hoc form of oversight conducted on the floor of parliament rather than the 
more systematic work conducted in committee. Van Dooren found that demand for 
indicators as expressed in parliamentary questions was higher than the ‘supply’ 
contained in ministerial answers (141 questions compared to 125 answers). MPs 
frequently asked for indicators on policy issues and indicators seemingly played an 
important role in the political arena under examination. Van Dooren established that 
indicators were included in 52 per cent of the MPs’ questions to the executive and in 
48 per cent of the executive’s answers. His study also detected significant differences 
between policy sectors. In quantitative terms, the policy sectors ‘mobility and public 
works’, ‘employment’, ‘welfare and public health’ and ‘housing’ produce more 
indicators and the policy sectors ‘internal affairs, ‘education’ and ‘culture’ have fewer 
indicators. Johnson and Talbot (see below) also drew similar conclusions. This 
finding provides encouragement to make comparisons between health and other 
 7 
policy sectors once the current exploratory study has been completed. Van Dooren 
also discovered that policy sectors differed in terms of the focus of measurement. For 
example ‘mobility and public works’ were input oriented, ‘housing’ was output 
oriented and ‘environment’ more effect-oriented. The current study will allow for the 
focus of performance metrics used by Scottish parliamentarians to be categorised and 
measured in a similar manner.  
 
Ho in examining the work of US mayors (including their oversight functions), 
concluded that performance measurement tools are perceived positively, but that their 
impact is dependent on sufficient integration into city planning systems and adequate 
communication taking place  between elected representatives and departmental staff 
and also whether stakeholders are involved in developing measures. (Ho makes a 
strong case for considering the role of mayor to be part-executive, part-oversight; 
hence the inclusion of the article in this review).  
 
ter Bogt studied the use of output orientated performance metrics by politicians in 
Dutch municipalities. He concluded that many Dutch aldermen saw little value in the 
output-oriented performance information that is available in the planning and control 
documents of their organizations and that they used it only infrequently. His study 
makes important points in relation to how user behaviour can be conceptualised and 
researched further. This is discussed below.  
 
From an analysis of the conduct of United Kingdom Parliamentary Select Committees 
and a survey of Select Committee members, Johnson and Talbot found that 
Parliament itself has been ‘more challenged by performance reporting than 
challenging of the executive’. Their study discusses attempts by Parliament to make 
performance scrutiny more systematic in character. Sterk and Bouckaert conducted a 
four-country study which compared performance budgeting initiatives in Australia, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada. In the report reviewed here, they described and 
explained the ‘performance of performance budgeting, from a ‘parliamentary angle’. 
The report provides sufficient evidence on performance metrics usage to merit 
inclusion in this review. They found little direct evidence that performance 
information found in budgets and annual reports was being used directly by members 
of parliament in their oversight function. They chose to qualify this finding by 
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allowing for the possibility that performance information influenced them in a more 
ad hoc or implicit way. Members of Parliament base their opinions on a wide range of 
data sources, they reasoned, and it is difficult to find out to what extent performance 
information influences them. Establishing the range of performance metrics sources 
used by Scottish parliamentarians will be an important element in the current study as 
will the possibility that ‘background’ use is more significant than ‘direct use’. 
 
Askim, in contrast with the other studies reviewed here, was interested in how 
performance metrics were used in the pre-decision, decision and post-decision 
implementation oversight contexts of Norwegian local government. The study 
establishes how important performance information was for councillors, concluding in 
marked contrast to ter Bogt that there were high levels of utilization exhibited across 
the policy process.  Askim concluded that politicians were eager to play the role of 
‘ombudsman’ and bring attention to gaps between aspirations and actual performance 
in service delivery. It appears that performance information is helpful to Norwegian 
councillors in identifying and articulating service delivery gaps.  As was the case with 
van Dooren’s study, this finding encourages consideration of how comparative 
international research could be conducted to quantify usage in different parliamentary 
or local government contexts.  
 
Research designs and methods 
The studies reviewed tended to employ a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods for gathering data, five of the seven projects involving two or more methods 
of gathering data. Surveys were popular but only Askim relied exclusively on a large 
scale postal questionnaire based method. Three other studies also used a postal 
questionnaire, but also employed face to face interviews to supplement the data 
gathered. Five studies used a content analysis of documents as part of the research 
process. Van Dooren alone relied entirely on this method in his examination of 
parliamentary questions, with multiple criteria used to organize the content analysis.  
Ho, Johnson and Talbot and Bogt and Askim all used surveys to collect data. Ho’s 
study employed a large sample (639) and achieved a reasonable response rate (39%) 
in line with what could reasonably have been hoped for, given the subjects. Bogt’s 
project secured a very similar response rate from roughly the same sample size. 
Johnson and Talbot surveyed 241 members of Parliament but only received a 17% 
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response. Askim was notably more successful in securing a 50% response rate from a 
sample of 1500. In assessing the viability of this method, logic suggests there was a 
strong likelihood that the responders were more interested or experienced in using 
performance metrics than the non-responders. It is unlikely that a higher response rate 
could be anticipated in a postal survey of Scottish parliamentarians.  
 
There is also the standard problem with a questionnaire based survey, where a 
response is likely to be hard to secure, in that a limit is placed on how much actual 
thought questions demand of respondents. For that reason questions need to be 
relatively easy to answer. The closed question solution used in the three 
questionnaire-based studies, carries an inherent risk of distorting respondents views 
on performance information. For example Ho’s questions to a certain extent 
presuppose that respondents accept there is an instrumental service-quality-enhancing 
purpose in using performance information, and prejudge what will be of importance to 
the mayors surveyed. Askim noted the problem of establishing that respondents 
understand what is meant by performance information. For example some Norwegian 
councilors might not differentiate between performance information and inputs data. 
Askim provided a brief definition and pre-tested this with a number of subjects. In the 
current study the broad scope of performance management, the need to deal with 
process, output and outcomes and the sheer number of health and community care 
performance metrics in circulation would have made a questionnaire communicated 
definition unworkable. Van Dooren employed a sophisticated nine categories content 
analysis of transcripts of proceedings in assessing the use of performance metrics 
made in parliamentary questions.  It was concluded that the current study should use a 
content analysis of the full transcripts available of meetings of the Committee under 
examination. As was the case with van Dooren’s content analysis, this will provide 
stronger evidence on actual behaviour than can be anticipated from the alternative 
research strategy of relying on self-reported behaviour collected through 
questionnaires and interviews. In line with most of the previous studies a two phase 
approach has been adopted for the current study, involving a content analysis of 
relevant documents followed by interviews with performance metrics producers and 
users. It is planned to conduct interviews with parliamentarians and other key actors 
in the oversight process. Content analysis derived data will allow for this stage of the 
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project to be conducted from a position where it is possible to differentiate between 
actual practice in relation to the use of performance metrics and claims of use.  
 
Four of the projects examined documents relating to a period of more than three years, 
reflecting an intention to capture a longitudinal perspective on user behaviour.  The 
content analysis therefore spans a nine year period 1999-2007. A longitudinal 
approach allows for developments in committee approach and individual behaviour to 
be followed and set in the context of policy change.   Ezzamel et al concluded that 
such an approach would be needed to answer some of the outstanding questions in 
their findings. In a bid to maximize the sense of policy and institutional context the 
current study deals with a longer time frame than previous projects. Additionally the 
current project examines parliamentarians who are either current or past members of 
the Committee. It is anticipated that a fuller picture will emerge of attitudes to 
performance metrics, if both current and past members of the committee are 
interviewed.  
 
Choice of subjects 
In deciding on the subject focus of the current project a number of useful observations 
were made on the seven studies under review. Ezzamel and colleagues conducted 
interviews with 58 parliamentarians, ministers, audit agency officers and advisers.  
Van Dooren examined parliamentary questions posed by members of the Flemish 
Parliament. A total of 270 questions were randomly selected across nine policy areas. 
The questions dated from 2002-3. The Ho study examines elected mayors who are 
operating in a part-executive, part-executive oversight capacity, in the sense that they 
take decisions and also call directors of city services to account. Bogt studied 
aldermen who similarly operate as an executive and as an oversight group in the 
context of Dutch municipalities. Johnson and Talbot researched the user behaviour of 
British Members of Parliament. Here select committees members were chosen as the 
‘users’ of performance rather than a random selection of individual members of 
parliament. This followed logically from the authors’ appreciation of recent 
parliamentary reforms. Since select committees were assigned a set of core tasks 
under the House of Commons modernization programme in 2002, they have been 
obliged to examine metrics and targets contained in PSAs as part of their remit.  The 
Sterk and Bouckaert study gathered data from the public service experts associated 
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with budget reforms, rather than the parliamentarians themselves.   Their findings 
therefore relate to opinions of how performance information was used by 
parliamentarians. Askim surveyed well over 13% of the total population of 
Norwegian local councilors. In taking the current study forward it was decided that 
the subjects to be examined should be parliamentarians whose role was exclusively 
confined to scrutiny of the executive. This particular choice of subjects removes a 
certain ambiguity as to the reasons for using performance metrics, which could 
confuse analysis and conclusions.  
 
Source of performance metrics 
On the basis of prior general knowledge about the role played by elected 
representatives in local government and national parliaments, it seemed obvious that 
they would access performance metrics in various forms and for multiple purposes. A 
limiting factor in the Ezzamel et al, Johnson and Talbot, Sterk and Bouckaert and to a 
lesser extent the Bogt studies is their concentration on responses to the budget process 
reform. Van Dooren is focused on the performance metrics produced by government 
and does not attempt to examine the use of non-government sources of performance 
information. Bogt, Ho and Askim appear more conscious of the need to recognise 
elected representatives’ position in a wider governance network than Ezzamel et al, 
Sterk and Bouckaert or Johnson and Talbot. An important part of the current project, 
both in document content analysis and interview phases, is concerned with identifying 
the policy networks which MSPs are part of and how this influences their use of  
performance metrics. The current project is examining parliamentarians and their 
responses to metrics, in whatever form or context they are produced. Parliamentarians 
may well prefer service data which is ‘richer’, more local or comparative, than that 
contained in for example budget process reports. For this reason a score will be kept 
of the number of references which particular sources of performance metrics merit in 
committee records and publications.  
 
A second issue is whether the provision of indicators is subject to ‘producer 
dominance’ in the sense that user behaviour is a supply-driven phenomenon. As 
pointed out by van Dooren the conventional position is that use of performance 
information is demand-driven and the need for information as expressed by politicians 
determines the supply. In reality it is quite possible that organizations by supplying 
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information are creating a demand. The current project is intended to investigate the 
extent to which producer dominance is evident in constraining the scope and quality 
of oversight through a monopoly of the range of performance metrics offered to 
politicians.   
 
Behavioural explanations 
Ezzamel et al  although concluding that the devolved parliaments in the United 
Kingdom had achieved a significant degree of transparency and openness in respect of 
budgetary and accounting information, were not in a position to offer evidence as to 
the use to which this was put to by parliamentarians.  They did however establish that 
knowledge of accounting practices , broadly defined to include performance was 
fairly limited amongst parliamentarians. Their respondents indicated that information 
overload is a factor for parliamentarians. Parliamentarians they discovered tended to 
prefer ‘rich information’ channeled through face to face contacts rather than look for 
information contained in ‘technical’ written formats.  The Ho and Bogt studies 
attempted to examine the behavioural basis of why performance metrics were used. 
Bogt found that aldermen most frequently receive information during informal, verbal 
consultations with top managers, with slightly less information being provided by 
formal meetings and consultations with the same managers. In general, all aldermen 
seemed to prefer rich, verbal information to sources of written information, probably 
because they work in a relatively complex and uncertain political environment. In the 
context of the current study it is important to note that the parliamentarians under 
scrutiny are outside government and will be largely excluded from the departmental 
driven rich information loop, but on the other hand are likely to meet frequently with 
‘local’ insiders such as NHS and social services managers in their constituencies, who 
may be their sources of rich information. They may also have personal contacts with 
performance metrics producers outside the central government loop.  They will 
certainly be the target of briefings organised by interest groups seeking to gain 
influence in parliament.  Bogt’s study reported that alderman are also draw on signals 
from and consultations with citizens and companies, news in various information 
media, signals from members of the municipal council. This is a demonstration of 
sorts that network governance prevails and that aldermen are linked into civic society, 
reducing their dependency on municipal government information sources. Askim was 
also able to produce evidence as to the respective popularity of different sources of 
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information, concluding that performance information contained in annual reports and 
balanced scorecards was preferred over national data bases or ‘local surveys’.  In the 
current study it can be predicted that parliamentarians will access a range of informal 
sources of information and more specifically performance metrics. For example a 
local media campaign may be used by a parliamentarian as their source of 
performance information on a local hospital, rather than the data produced by the 
hospital itself or a central audit agency. Ho concluded that performance measurement 
tools were perceived positively, but their impact was dependent on the extent of 
integration into the city’s planning system, the quality of communication between 
elected representatives and departmental staff and also whether stakeholders were 
involved in developing performance measures. These are factors which will also be 
examined in the current project. 
 
Bogt acknowledged but was unable to examine the possibility that aldermen’s 
opinions and their use of information could be influenced by their educational 
backgrounds, professional experience in previous jobs and political backgrounds. The 
current project will examine this further, seeking to explore the extent to which 
individual and party backgrounds appear to impact on performance metrics usage 
patterns.  
 
Bogt also raised the intriguing possibility that performance information usage 
behaviour can be explained by the concept of ‘political efficiency’. Here claims are 
made that conscious calculations are made by politicians over the value of the various 
effort that they can make to attract voters in elections. Bogt observed that for example 
politicians may conclude that members of particular interest groups and voters, do not 
judge politicians only or primarily in terms of economic efficiency as revealed 
through performance metrics. In the context of health service policy in Scotland, 
parliamentarians are likely to be acutely aware of the way in which voters will 
interpret policies in their constituencies. It is quite possible for instance, that support 
for an efficient, economic and effective policy of centralising neurological services in 
one Scottish hospital, may be highly politically inefficient in the sense that even when 
performance metrics are readily available, difficult, time consuming justifications 
would be required to protect votes in constituencies where such facilities were 
earmarked for closure. Bogt’s discussion of political efficiency raises wider questions 
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related to the economics of performance metrics usage by parliamentarians. 
Parliamentarians we can assume are utility maximisers. It is logical to presume that at 
some level a calculation goes on in the minds of parliamentarians, when faced with 
the possibility of reviewing a set of performance metrics along lines comprehensible 
in economic terms. To some extent at least other means of engaging with issues of a 
more ‘sentimental’ or subjective kinds are likely to be considered. The second stage 
of the current project which will involve interviews is intended to address these 
issues.  
 
In the study which reported the greatest enthusiasm for use of performance metrics by 
politicians, Askim found that over 70% of councilors thought performance 
information was important in agenda setting, although not so significant as ‘input 
from the local population’. When asked to consider the importance of performance 
information for evaluating the implementation of the municipal authorities policies, 
72% of Askim’s respondents reported that it gave them a good idea of the 
population’s needs were being met. A further 65% also agreed that performance 
information gave them an ability to identify parts of the service that were not 
performing to satisfaction.   
 
Van Dooren laid stress on examining the link between user behaviour and supply of 
performance metrics by government departments and associated agencies. His study 
was able to differentiate between the volume, quality and type of performance metric 
supplied in different sectors of the Flemish Governments areas of competency.  His 
conclusions encourage further investigation into the limitations imposed by metrics 
producers. Most policy sectors showed an undersupply of indicators. The main 
undersupply was to be found in the policy sector ‘welfare and public health’. In 
particular, effect indicators are lacking in this policy sector. The extent to which 
behaviour of performance metrics users in the Scottish Parliament is constrained by 
producer limitations in terms of the quality and scope of data made available is a 
question worth pursuing and should be taken account of in the design of the current 
project.  
 
Askim was also able to differentiate between the attitudes of councilors with 
responsibilities for different policy areas in respect of the utility of performance 
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information. Claimed utilization was higher among councillors working with elderly 
care, administrative affairs, and educational affairs than among councillors working 
with cultural affairs, technical services and planning and commercial development. 
The link between policy area and performance metrics utilization is therefore an issue 
which should be considered in the current study. Health care is assumed to have 
generated a greater depth of performance information than other policy sectors in the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Existing research suggests that behaviours exhibited in relation to the use of 
performance metrics may be sometimes be unexpected. Sterk & Bouckaert (2006) for 
example suggest there may be even be unintended negative consequences associated 
with the transparency motivated budget reforms they have examined in a comparative 
study of four countries. They conclude that despite the fact that the performance 
budgeting reforms had the claimed purpose of increasing transparency of the budget; 
the complexity of the budgeting process was also increased during the same policy 
phase. Hard to grasp technical accounting reforms combined with transparency 
reforms appeared to have cancelled out any potential to increase usage by 
parliamentarians. The current project is designed to identify any similar paradoxical 
impacts associated with parliamentarians’ use of performance metrics in the act of 
oversight.  
 
Institutional context 
Ezzamel et al, van Dooren and Johnson and Talbot and Sterk and Bouckaert all pay 
attention to the legislative institutions structure and working practices in the 
parliaments they examine. While Askim provides little information on institutional 
context, the attention given to the linkage between policy area and utilization is of 
significance in terms of understanding the significance of institutions. A similar 
conclusion can be made in respect of van Dooren’s study. While previous studies 
have recognised the importance of institutions it is quite possible that a more detailed 
appreciation of rules and practices will be needed to explain user behaviour 
adequately in the context of the current study. For example in the Scottish Parliament 
is ‘overload’ evident, meaning that members are overwhelmed by the volume of 
information produced? If so is this effect which a number of researchers have hinted 
at, a consequence of limited individual  capacity for information handling or related to 
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an institutional weakness in allowing systems to be established for the management of 
knowledge?  Or regarding a different aspect of institutional context that is referred to 
as the ‘party system’, it is immediately obvious that in contrast with Westminster, the 
Scottish parliamentary system where the current study is located has required political 
parties to form governing coalitions. So far Labour and the Liberal Democrats, during 
1999-2007 and from 2007 onwards a minority SNP-Green Party coalition, have 
formed governments. Related to the balance in political party strength in the Scottish 
Parliament, there is a distinct possibility that the precise nature of government-
backbencher relationships have an impact on the uses made of performance metrics. 
Both Johnson and Talbot and Sterk and Bouckaert point to the dominance of the 
executive power in the budget process. In the context of the current study executive 
dominance is a factor which must be taken into account. There is also in broader 
terms a need to gain more detailed knowledge of the oversight process within the 
context of the Scottish Parliament. It is clear that relatively little is known about the 
institutional practices which impact on the consumption of performance metrics by 
parliamentarians in the act of oversight. For this reason it is intended to conduct 
interviews with officials in the Scottish Parliament, Scottish Government and key 
audit agencies in an effort to supplement evidence drawn from the content analysis of 
Committee meetings transcripts conducted.  
 
6. Summary  
 
The review of empirical studies conducted in this working paper has been used to help 
design a research project, which will attempt to capture the complex nature of end-
user behaviour in relation to performance metrics. In drawing on previous research a 
more rounded and exhaustive programme of investigation can be developed than 
would have been the case without the studies examined in this working paper. The 
study is nevertheless an exploratory exercise, which will at times identify behaviours 
that will only be understood when further empirical work is conducted. This will be 
designed to make comparisons either between user behaviour in different policy 
sectors or parliamentary contexts and will provide a sense of perspective lacking in 
the literature thus far.  The study currently being undertaken will provide the 
conceptual and methodological basis for further comparative work. The results of the 
 17 
current project will initially appear on the Public Services Programme in the form of 
further working papers and conference papers.  
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